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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RULES GOVERNING
HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION
COMPLAINTS IN PRIVATE AND
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
FrancisAchampong*

I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination present
troubling issues in today's workplaces. Discrimination suits have been

filed under Title VII of'the Civil Rights Act of 1964' ("Title VII") since
its enactment. However, it was not until 1976 that sexual harassment

resulting in job detriment was first recognized as a legitimate cause of
action.2 It was also later recognized as a viable cause of action in cases

where, although no tangible employment action was taken, a hostile
work environment had nonetheless resulted In 1980, The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC or Commission")
amended its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex

("Guidelines"), to add a section expressly dealing with sexual
harassment.4 The Guidelines recognized both a claim for harassment
* Director of Academic Affairs, Penn State Mont Alto. He has a LL.B. (magna cum laude)
(University of Ghana), LL.M. (Georgetown), LL.M., Ph.D. (University of London) and is a member
of the New York and Virginia Bars. He is admitted to practice before the Supreme Court and
appears in Who's Who in AMERICAN LAW. He is the author of the text, WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE

RISK MANAGEMENT (1999).

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
2. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that the plaintiffs
allegations of harassment and termination for refusing a male supervisor's sexual advances was a
valid cause of action under Title VII), rev'd on other grounds and vacated in part by Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
3. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing a hostile
environment as a violation of Title VII, and holding that "conditions of employment" include
emotional and psychological work environments).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2002); EEOC, Final Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11)
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resulting in a tangible employment action or "quid pro quo" harassment
and harassment resulting in a hostile environment.6 In 1986, the Supreme
Court, in MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson,7 recognized sexual harassment
as a valid cause of action under Title VII. s
Much has been written about substantive issues in employment
discrimination and sexual harassment. In the area of sexual harassment,
for example, authors have explored the issue of employer liability for
supervisor and coworker harassment,9 employer liability for harassment
by non-employees,'0 the proper perspective for determining whether a
working environment is hostile, same-sex sexual harassment,'2 and use
[hereinafter Because of Sex Guidelines].
5. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(l)-(2) (describing quid pro quo sexual harassment);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-62 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 790 (1998) (expressing a preference for the term harassment resulting in a "tangible
employment action" as opposed to "quid pro quo" sexual harassment); see also Heyne v. Caruso, 69
F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that quid pro quo sexual harassment is established when the
complainant shows "that an individual 'explicitly or implicitly conditionfedi a job, a job benefit, or
the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct' (quoting
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994))).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 I(a)(3) (describing hostile environment sexual harassment); Gallant v.
Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 997 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing that in a
hostile environment, requests and conduct of a sexual nature are unwelcome and severe); EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2 (Nov. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Compliance Manual] (explaining the
Because of Sex Guidelines and the EEOC's rules governing investigation of sexual harassment
charges).
7. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
8. /d. at 73.
9. See, e.g., Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual
HarassmentAfter Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1987); B. Glenn
George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U.L. REV. 1, 4 (1993); see
also Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a
Supervisor: A Critical Assessment of the Supreme Court's New Vicarious Liability Standard, 28
Sw.U.L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1998); Jon D. Bible, A Second Generation of Sexual HarassmentLaw:
The Supreme Court Rewrites the Rulesfor the Workplace, 50 LAB. L.J. 115, 124-25 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Lome H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by
Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447, 451 (1994);
Francis Achampong, Third Party Harassment and Other SignificantRecent Developments in Sexual
Harassment Law: A Discussion of the Latest Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment
Litigation, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994); Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment by
Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer Liability, 9 EMP. REL. L.J. 98, 98 (1983); Mark Hansen,
The Next Litigation Frontier?Claims Against Employers for Third-PartyHarassmenton the Rise,
79 A.B.A. J. 1, 26 (1993); Jerome R. Watson, Employer Liability for the Sexually Harassing
Actions of Its Customers, 19 EMP. REL. L.J. 227, 227 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Francis Achampong, A Critical Analysis of the Two-Pronged Perspective for
Viewing A Hostile Environment in Sexual HarassmentCases, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 303, 303 (1995);
Karenina M. Darmer, Ninth Circuit Adopts Reasonable Woman Standard in Hostile Environment
Sexual HarassmentCases-Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
311, 311 (1992); Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progressor
Illusion?,28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 619-20 (1993).
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of arbitration to resolve sexual harassment complaints. 3 Other writings
have also addressed employer anti-harassment policies, 4 the use of
expert witnesses in hostile environment sexual harassment cases,' 5 rand
whether a single, sexual harassment event can create a hostile
environment. 6 Although there is also a plethora of writing on
substantive issues in all areas of employment discrimination, the
complex rules governing the processing of harassment and
discrimination complaints in private and federal employment, as well as
their policy ramifications, have been largely ignored.
This paper undertakes an examination of the procedural rules for
filing harassment and other discrimination complaints in private and
federal employment. It then examines the governmental policy
objectives that underlie these rules, whether the different regulatory
approaches in the federal and private sectors are rational from a policy
viewpoint, and whether the regulatory measures are adequate to promote
the government's policy goals.

12. See, e.g., Francis Achampong, The Evolution of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law: A
Critical Examination of the Latest Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment Litigation, 73
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 701, 708 (1999); Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII,
37 S. TEX. L. REV. 699, 701-02 (1996); Janet Castro, Comment, Redefining the Parameters of Title
VII in Accordance with Equal Protection Standards: The United States Supreme Court's
Recognition of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment As a Form of Discrimination, 9 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 123, 127 (1998); S. Ashby Williams, Comment, Long Overdue: The Actionability of Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 35 Hous. L. REV. 895, 896 (1998); Sally Roberts,
Resolving to Cut Litigation Costs, Bus. INS., May 15, 1995, at 1.
13. See, e.g., Stephen M. Crowe & Clifford M. Koen, Sexual Harassment: New Challenge for
Labor Arbitrators?, 47 ARB. J. 6, 6 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Based on a Single Occurrence, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 187, 200 (1995); Kristen
Perhach, Can A Single Act Create A Hostile Work Environment?: Radtke v. Everett, 9 T. M.
COOLEY L. REV. 519, 519-20 (1992).

15. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Pastemak, Sexual Harassment and Expertise: The Admissibility of
Expert Witness Testimony in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman Standard, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 651, 686-87 (1995).
16. See generally Achampong, supra note 14, at 187; Francis Achampong, Effective Risk
Management of the Hostile Environment: Sexual Harassment Liability Loss Exposure, 49 CPCU J.

212, 212-13 (1996); Steven D. Baderian et al., Managing Employment Risks in Light of the New
Ruling in Sexual Harassment Law, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 344 (1999).
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HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION CHARGES BY PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYEES UNDER TITLE VIC'

A. Role of the EEOC
The EEOC, established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, is responsible for enforcing the statute's antidiscrimination
provisions. 8 It has five members who are appointed by the President of
the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 9 It has
power to issue interpretative guidelines to aid compliance with Title VII
and to conduct litigation to enforce it.20 The EEOC also has power to
combat unlawful employment practices." It is illegal for an employer to
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." Furthermore, it is unlawful to
discriminate against an employee for opposing unlawful employment
practices, or for participating in any manner in an investigation or
hearing."
The EEOC has power to effectuate Title VII's provisions through
conference, conciliation and persuasion; it also has the power to
intervene in civil actions brought by aggrieved persons against privatesector respondents.' Where prompt judicial action is necessary to ensure
that Title VII is not violated, the EEOC has the power to seek
preliminary injunctive relief after a charge is filed." An employee may
not, by signing a mandatory arbitration agreement, compromise the
EEOC's right to bring an action against an employer pursuant to its
independent enforcement powers under Title VII. 26
17. The rules discussed in this section apply to all private sector charges of discrimination
under Title VII, including sexual harassment.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.§§ 2000e-4(b)(l), e-4(g).
21. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
22. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
24. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The EEOC may not intervene in actions against government agencies
or political subdivisions.
25. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
26. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291, 296 (2002). The Supreme Court held
that an employee's signing of a mandatory arbitration agreement does not preclude the EEOC from
exercising its independent right of action to pursue both make-whole and victim-specific on the
employee's behalf. Id.
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B. Procedurefor Processing Charges
When an aggrieved person, someone acting on his or her behalf, or
a member of the EEOC, files a charge alleging unlawful employment
practices by a covered employer or organization, this triggers an action
on the part of the EEOC. The EEOC is required to serve notice of the
charge on the employer within ten days of its filing and to investigate the
charge.27 If the EEOC decides after its investigation that the charge is not
supported by reasonable cause, it will dismiss the charge and notify the
charging party and the respondent of its action. If the charging party
first appeared before a state, local, deferral or Fair Employment
Practices ("FEP") agency, the EEOC will accord substantial weight to
the final findings or orders of that agency29 in determining whether the
charge is supported by reasonable cause.30 If the EEOC decides that the
charge is supported by reasonable cause, it will use an informal and
confidential process of conference, conciliation, and persuasion to
attempt to eliminate the unlawful employment practice." The charge and
any information produced by its investigation are confidential and may
not be used in subsequent litigation. However, earlier disclosures made
to state or local FEP agencies assisting the EEOC in its Title VII
functions are not confidential.33 Where conciliation after a reasonable
cause determination is successful, the EEOC is required to obtain the
respondent's agreement to remove
the unlawful employment practice
34
and furnish appropriate relief.
A reasonable cause determination must be made within 120 days of
the charge.3" If the charging party first proceeded before a state or local
FEP agency, or if a member of the EEOC filed the charge, then the
EEOC must make a reasonable cause determination within 120 days

27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The employer must be informed of the date and the nature of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC first determines that the
employer is a covered employer with fifteen or more employees. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (2002) (containing a list of state FEP agencies and section 1601
containing procedural requirements).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(e). This does not include according weight to the FEP agency's
conclusions of law but to. its factual findings made from proceedings that are fair and regular, and
orders based thereon. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
32. Id.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (2002).
34. Id. § 1601.24(a).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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from the time it is authorized to act.36 Such a determination is not a
judgment on the merits of the charging party's allegations.37 Once a
reasonable cause determination is made, prompt notice must be given to
all parties involved.38 On the other hand, if the EEOC finds a lack of
reasonable cause "to believe that an unlawful employment practice has
occurred, or is occurring," it will notify the parties of its no cause
determination.39 A finding of reasonable cause or no cause may be
reconsidered within certain limitations. 0
A charge may be dismissed for a number of reasons, including
untimeliness, failure to state a Title VII claim or produce requested
information, failure to attend conferences, and rejection by the charging
party of a settlement which offers full relief after having had thirty days
to consider the offer.4' A decision to dismiss may be reconsidered.42
When investigating a charge, the EEOC has authority to conduct a
fact-finding conference with the parties and request statements from the
charging party regarding the details of the alleged harassment or
discriminatory practice before making a good-faith determination.
The charging party must be able to provide a statement as to why an
employment practice is believed to be unlawful." The conference allows
a definition of the issues, determination of disputed facts, and possible
settlement. The parties may agree to settle on the condition that a
charge is withdrawn. 6
The EEOC has power to subpoena witnesses and records to
facilitate the performance of its functions.4 ' Any member of the EEOC
can issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify and
the production of evidentiary materials. 48 Witnesses are entitled to the

36. Id.
37. 29C.F.R. § 1601.21(a).
38. Id. § 1601.21(b).
39. Id. § 1601.19(a).
40. Id. § 1601.19(b) (discussing the reconsideration of no cause determinations). For example,
there may not be a reconsideration of a reasonable cause determination after suit has already been
filed or ninety days have expired since the issuance of a right to sue letter. Id. § 1601.28(e)(1).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18.
42. Id. § 1601.18(f).
43. Id. § 1601.15(b)-(c).
44. Id. § 1601.15(b)(2).
45. Id. § 1601.15(c).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20(b).
47. Id. § 1601.16(a).
48. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol20/iss1/2
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same fees and mileage49 available in the courts and are subject to penalties
for failure to comply.
It must be noted that "an aggrieved individual may not withdraw
her charge without the consent of the EEOC."50 If the EEOC denies an
individual's consent to withdraw a charge, the EEOC may proceed to
prosecute its own civil action against an employer on the basis of that
charge.' The EEOC depends on the filing of charges for notification of
potential sexual discrimination. 2 Futhermore, courts have observed that
individuals may not contract away their rights to file a charge because
such contracts are void as against public policy. 3 Thus, "an individual
may not, in an effort to effectuate her own interests, take away the
enforcement authority of the EEOC even if she wishes to withdraw her
charge of discrimination."
C. Contents of a Charge
An aggrieved person, or any person, agency, or organization acting
on the aggrieved person's behalf,55 may file a charge alleging sexual
harassment or discrimination in violation of Title VII.56 The charge must
be written, signed, and verified,57 and must indicate the name, address,
and telephone number of the person making the charge. 8 It must also
give the name and address of the respondent, and an account of the facts
grounding the charge with relevant dates.5 9 If proceedings have been
commenced with a state or local FEP agency, then the charge must state
that fact. 6° Additionally, amendments that relate to, or grow out of, the
subject matter of the original charge, such as retaliation following the

49. Id. § 1601.16(d)-(e).
50. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1601.10).
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10; Frank'sNursery & Crafts, 177 F.3d at 456.
52. EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987).
53. Id.
54. Frank'sNursery & Crafts, 177 F.3d at 456.
55. Although both men and women may be victims of sexual harassment, "[t]he lion's share
of sexual harassment situations features the man as the harasser and the woman as the harassee."
Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a).
57. Id. § 1601.9. The EEOC will allow a complainant to file by mail or telephone, in which
case the EEOC drafts a formal charge and sends it to the complainant for signature. Id. §§ 1601.9,
1601.7.
58. Id. § 1601.12(a).
59. Id. § 1601.12(a)(2)-(3).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(5).
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filing of the original charge, are allowed by the EEOC,6 ' and are
retroactive to the date of the original charge.6"
D. Time Periodfor Filing a Charge
Where a charging party is not subject. to a -state or local FEP
agency, a charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged violation."63
Even though there may be a FEP agency, this same time period applies
where that agency has no jurisdiction in sexdiscrimination matters. 64
Where the charging party is subject to the jurisdiction of a Fair
Employment Practices' agency, the EEOC will defer to that agency,
unless the agency waives its right to exclusively process the charge
65
within the sixty-day period. Where a FEP agency has jurisdiction, the
charging party must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged violation. 66 This 300-day time period applies even where the FEP
agency waives its right to exclusively process the charge for the sixtyday period, or terminates its proceedings earlier.67 Only a few states do
not have such a deferral agency.68 The time period for filing a charge is
subject to equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel, and is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit. 69 A continuing
violation would also toll the time period and allow a charge to be filed

61. Id. § 1601.12(b).
62. Id.
.63. Id. § 1601.13(a)(1).
64. Id. § 1601.13(a)(2).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(ii)-(iii).
66. Id. § 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A).
67. Id. § 1601.13(b)(1). The collaboration between the EEOC and the state FEP agency in
such cases is pursuant to a worksharing agreement. Id. § 1601.13(c); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1) (2000);
EEOC v. Commerical Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 125 (1988).
68. LAWRENCE SOLOTOF & HENRY S. KRAMER, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 2-13 to 2-15 (Release 14 2002). Only four states, Alabama,
Georgia, North Carolina, and Mississippi, do not have a deferral agency with jurisdiction analogous
to that of the EEOC. Id.. Georgia's statute applies only to the public sector; North Carolina's statute
merely declares that discrimination is against public policy. Id. at 2-15 n.l.
69. See Zipes v. TWA, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that "filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is Subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling").
The Court also noted that the provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title VII does not
limit it to.those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC. Id.; see also Llewellyn
v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 379 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (holding equitable tolling was allowed
because psychological problems resulting from the sexual harassment prevented the plaintiff from
filing a timely charge).
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for acts falling outside the time period, as long as they are part of a
pattern of behavior. 0
In Klein v. McGowan,7 the plaintiff sued under both federal law
and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, after filing a sexual harassment
72
charge with the EEOC more than ten months after resigning.
The district court dismissed the Title VII claim as being untimely.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that the plaintiff had to file the
EEOC charge within 300 days of the event that gave rise to the cause of
action. 4 The 300-day period applied because Minnesota's FEP agency
had jurisdiction over the matter. 5 The court stated conduct occurring
before this period cannot be grounds for a suit unless it is part of a
continuing violation.76 It further stated that to fall under the exception,
the plaintiff must prove some incident of harassment within the 300-day
period and a sufficient nexus between that incident and the other
instances of harassment.77 Affirming the lower Eighth Circuit, the court
found that the four incidents alleged during the 300-day period did not
amount to severe or pervasive harassment, nor were they based on sex."
In Chambers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,7 9 the plaintiffs Title VII sexual
harassment suit was dismissed for failure to file a charge within 180
days of the offending conduct."' Georgia does not have a comprehensive
FEP statute giving its FEP agency jurisdiction over private plaintiffs.8 '
Its statute only applies to the public sector, hence the 180-day period.
70. SOLOTOFF & KRAMER, supra note 68, at 2-12.29 to 2-12.30.. The Supreme Court has
validated the concept of a continuing violation, giving plaintiffs a cause of action under Title VII for
incidents occurring before and after the limitation period, provided that: (1) at least one incident
occurred within the limitation period; and (2) the filing is timely as measured from that event. This
is justified on the basis that continuing violation cases are distinct from the state cases that the
statute of limitations is designed to keep out of the courts. Id. In its very recent decision in National
PassengerRail Road Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the entire
scope of a hostile environment claim may be considered in determining liability, as long as any
contributing act falls within the statutory period.
71. 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1999).
at 707.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 708.
74. Id. at 709.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000).
76. Klein, 198 F.3d at 709.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 710.
79. 70 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
80. Id. at 1314.
81. SOLOTOFF & KRAMER, supra note 68, at 2-13 to 2-14 (noting that Georgia's FEP statutes
covering sexual discrimination apply only to public sector employees).
82. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-19-21 to 45-19-22 (1990); SOLOTOFF & KRAMER, supra note 68,
at 2-14;
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In Chambers, the court pointed out that the 180-day period begins to run
from the date of the discriminatory act.83
A charging party who first proceeds to a state or local FEP agency
may request the agency to file the charge with the EEOC.4 In that case,
it is deemed filed with the EEOC within sixty days of sending a written,
signed statement to the FEP agency by registered mail.85 In the
alternative, it is deemed filed after receipt of the statement by the FEP
agency, or upon whichever of the following alternatives first occurs,
either termination of the FEP agency's proceedings or the FEP agency's
waiver of the right of exclusive processing. 86 Also, the charging party
may choose to file the charge initially with the EEOC, a state FEP
agency, or both. 7
E. Serving a Charge
The EEOC must serve a charge on the respondent within ten days
of being filed.88 Service may be by mail or in person.89 However, failure
to serve the charge within the ten-day period is not an absolute bar to the
enforcement of Title VII's provisions.90 The EEOC must show that its
failure to give timely notice was not willful or in bad faith, and the
respondent must show that it has been prejudiced by the delay. 9'
F. Right to Sue
As pointed out in the recent case of EEOC v. Frank's Nursery &
Crafts, Inc.,92 "[a]n individual may not file suit under Title VII if she
does not possess a 'right to sue' letter from the EEOC." 93 A charging
party may request that the EEOC issue a right to sue letter after the

Chambers, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
83. Chambers, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b)(1) (2002).
85. Id.
86. Id. The sixty-day period may be extended to 120 days where appropriate.
87. Id. § 1601.13(b)(2).
88. Id. § 1601.14(a).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a).
90. EEOC v. Burlington N., Inc., 644 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 721 (holding that Congress did not intend to prevent the EEOC from suing because
of an unintentional defect in compliance, without showing that such non-compliance has prejudiced
the defendant-employer).
92. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 456.
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expiration of 180 days from the filing of the charge.94 If the respondent is
the government, a government agency, or political subdivision, then the
Attorney General issues the right to sue letter.95 The EEOC may still
assist the charging party after issuing the letter, unless the charging
party's attorney requests authority to file a lawsuit.9 6 The EEOC may
then file an amicus brief that presents its position to the court.97
Otherwise, issuance of the letter normally ends the EEOC's proceedings
with respect to the charge.99 A charging party has ninety days from the
receipt of the letter to commence suit, although the period may be tolled
for equitable reasons. 99 In Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia,'°° the
plaintiff filed suit ninety-two days after receiving the right to sue letter.'
Her case was dismissed by the district court.' °2 On appeal, she argued
that the limitations period should be tolled on equitable grounds because
the harassment rendered her non compos mentis, causing her to be too
distraught to grasp the significance of the ninety-day limitations
period.' 3 Affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia found no evidence that she did not understand the meaning
of the time limit in the letter, or that she was unable to engage in rational
thought and deliberate decision making sufficient to pursue her claim. ' ,
Where the charging party does not have legal representation, the EEOC
may elect to file suit on behalf of the aggrieved party or parties after
conciliation fails. 0 5
The EEOC has issued an early right to sue regulation which allows
it, upon a complainant's request, to authorize a private suit at any time
prior to the expiration of 180 days from the date of filing the charge with
the Commission.'0 However, an appropriate Commission official must
determine that "it is probable that the Commission will be unable to

94. Id.
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d) (2002).
96. Id. § 1601.28(a)(4), (b)(4).
97. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. EEOC, 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3).
99. Id. § 1601.28(e)(1). Notice to the charging party's attorney is sufficient notice to the
charging party.
100. 155 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cit. 1998). The court ruled that a doctor's diagnosis might have
strengthened the plaintiffs claim; however, her affidavit, standing alone, did not support her claim
for equitable tolling. Id. at 579-80.
101. Id. at 577.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 580.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (2002).
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complete its administrative processing of the charge within 180 days
from the filing of the charge." 7 There is a split in the federal circuit
courts and the federal district courts as to whether this regulation is
valid, since Title VII provides for the issuance of a right to sue letter
after the expiration of 180 days from the filing of the charge.' °8
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld this regulation and allowed
early suits.0 9 However, the District of Columbia Circuit has found the
regulation contrary to Congress' clearly expressed intent in Title VII and
has refused an early right to sue."0 The D.C. Circuit believes that
Congress clearly intended to prohibit private suits within 180 days after
charges are filed and that allowing the Commission to issue early right
to sue letters would be an abdication of its statutory duty to investigate
every charge.
III.

HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION CHARGES BY
EMPLOYEES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

A federal employee who has been sexually harassed or
discriminated against must follow specified complaint-processing
procedures in seeking relief and protection against discrimination. These
procedures for processing employee discrimination complaints are
established by respective federal agencies under the authority of
regulations issued by the EEOC."' The procedures apply to
discrimination complaints by employees of federal agencies under Title

107. Id. § 1601.28(a)(1).
108. Id.
109. Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 1994) (permitting a
complainant to sue); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726,
729 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing an early right to sue).
110. Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (refusing an
early right to sue). The D.C. Circuit based its decision on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) which states that
"the Commission 'shall' investigate a charge and 'shall' make a reasonable cause determination 'as
promptly as possible' and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the
filing of the charge." Id. at 1346 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). The Martini court could not
reconcile early termination of the process with this section's express directive that the EEOC
investigate all charges. Id. at 1341-42.
111. Id. at 1347-48. Since the plaintiff was allowed to sue twenty-one days after her charge
was filed, the court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss
the plaintiff's case without prejudice until the EEOC had attempted to resolve her charge for an
additional 159 days. Id. The plaintiff could file a new suit if there was no resolution after the 180
days. Martini, 178 F.3d at 1347-48.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.104(a) (2002).
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3
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),"
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, ' 14 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963."'

A. Conciliation
The first step in seeking relief is conciliation in an attempt to
informally resolve the complaint. The aggrieved person must first confer
with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor ("Counselor") prior
to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter."'
The aggrieved person must contact a Counselor within forty-five days of
the alleged harassment."7 The Counselor advises the aggrieved person in
writing of his or her rights and responsibilities, including the right to
request a hearing or an immediate final decision after an agency
investigation."8 The Counselor also advises the aggrieved person of the
right to file a notice of intent to sue and to choose between participating
in the agency's alternative dispute resolution program and counseling." 9
The Counselor is required to submit a written report to the agency
and the aggrieved person within fifteen days concerning the issues
discussed and action taken during counseling.' 20 Unless the aggrieved
person chooses an alternative dispute resolution or agrees to extend the
counseling period, the Counselor must conduct a final interview with the
aggrieved person within thirty days of the date the complainant
contacted the agency's Equal Employment Opportunity office to request
counseling.'' If the matter is not resolved, the Counselor then notifies
the aggrieved person, no later than thirty days after the Counselor was
contacted, of the right to file a complaint within fifteen days of receipt of
the notice and the appropriate official with whom to file it. 2 This notice
may be delayed by agreement between the aggrieved person and the

113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2001).
114. Id.
§§ 791-794a.
115. See id. § 206..Procedures for filing discrimination complaints by federal agency
employees under 29 C.F.R. section 1614.103.
116. 29C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 117. Id. § 1614.105(b)(1).
118. Id.
119. Id.§ 1614.105(b)(2). Each federal agency is required to make available an alternative
dispute resolution program for both the pre-complaint and the formal complaint process, to provide
for the counseling of aggrieved persons, and the processing of individual and class complaints. Id.
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(c).
121. Id.
§ 1614.105(d).
122. Id.
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agency to extend 2the
counseling period for an additional period not to
3
exceed sixty days.
Where the aggrieved person chooses alternative dispute resolution,
the period for resolution is ninety days.'24 If there is no resolution within
that time period, the Counselor then informs the aggrieved person of the
right to file a formal complaint.' 25 Unless the employee authorizes the
Counselor to reveal his or her identity, the employee's
identity is kept
26
filed.
is
complaint
formal
a
until
confidential
A formal complaint must be in writing, signed, and filed with the
agency that allegedly discriminated against the complainant.'27
The complaint must be filed within fifteen days of receiving notice from
the Counselor of the right to file a formal complaint.12 According to the
regulations, a document is "deemed timely [filed] if it is received or
postmarked before the expiration of the applicable filing period, or, in
the absence of a legible postmark, if it is received by mail within five
days of the expiration of the applicable filing period."' 29 The complaint
may be dismissed for, among other things, failure to state a claim or
untimeliness, unless the agency extends the time limits."3
When an agency dismisses a complaint or receives a request for an
immediate final decision, the agency shall issue a final decision
consisting of its findings on the merits of the issues, the rationale for
dismissing the complaint, or if discrimination is found, appropriate
remedies and relief. 3' An agency is required to issue a final decision
within sixty days of a request by the complainant.'32 Where no request is
made for a final decision or a hearing before an administrative judge, a
final decision must be issued within sixty days after the end of the thirtyday period during which the complainant should have made such a
request. ' The final action shall notify the complainant of the right to
appeal to the EEOC or file a civil lawsuit, and the applicable time limits
for appeals and lawsuits. "4

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. § 1614.105(e).
Id. § 1614.105(f).
29C.F.R. § 1614.105(d).
Id. § 161 4 .105(g).
Id. § 1614.106(a)-(c).
Id. § 1614.106(b).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1)-(2).
Id.§ 1614.110(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Investigation
The agency is required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint in
writing and advise the complainant of the EEOC office where a request
for a hearing shall be sent.'35 The acknowledgment shall also inform the
complainant that the agency is required to conduct an impartial and
appropriate investigation within 180 days of the filing of the complaint,
unless the parties agree in writing to extend the time period. 3 6 If the
complainant has amended the complaint after it was first filed, then the
agency is required to "complete its investigation within the earlier of 180
days after the last amendment to the complaint or 360 days after the
,,137 However, the "complainant may
filing of the original complaint.
request a hearing from an administrative judge on the consolidated
complaints any time after 180 days from the date of the first filed
complaint."' 38
The agency against which the complaint is filed conducts the
investigation.'39 The agency is required to develop an impartial and
appropriate factual record which they use to make findings on the issues
raised in the written complaint.'40 Fact-finding methods that "efficiently
and thoroughly address the matters at issue"'',

such as interrogatories,

exchanging of letters and memoranda and fact-finding conferences, may
be used. 42 The agency should attempt to use alternative dispute
the investigation to facilitate early
resolution techniques during
43
resolution of complaints.
Within 180 days from the filing of the complaint, or where
amended, within the earlier of 180 days after the last amendment or 360
days after the original complaint, the agency "shall provide the
complainant with a copy of the investigative file."'" It shall also notify
the complainant that within thirty days of receipt of the file, the
complainant has the right to request a hearing and decision from an
administrative judge or an immediate final decision from the agency.141

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

29C.F.R. § 1614.106(e).
ld. § 1614.106(e)(2).
Id.
Id. § 1614.106(e)(2).
Id. § 1614.108(a).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(b).
Id. § 1614.108(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1614.108(0.
29C.F.R. § 1614.108(0.
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After receiving the required notice, or at any time following 180 days
from the time of the filing of the complaint, the complainant may submit
a written request for a hearing to the EEOC and a copy to the agency's
Equal Employment Opportunity office. 46 Within fifteen days of
receiving the request, the agency must furnish the EEOC with a copy ,of
the entire complaint file.'47 A copy shall also be given to the complainant
if that has not already been done. 4"
C. Hearing
When a complainant requests a hearing, the EEOC appoints an
administrative judge ("judge") to conduct the hearing.'49 The judge
assumes full responsibility for adjudicating the complaint and
"overseeing development of the record."' 5 The judge may dismiss a
complaint on his own initiative, or on the motion of the agency, for
reasons including untimeliness and failure to state a claim.'5 ' At any time
after a written complaint is filed, but before a judge has been appointed
to the hearing, the agency may make a written offer to resolve or settle
5 2 The offer
the case.'
must include attorney's fees and costs and must
specify any non-monetary relief.'53 Monetary relief may be offered in the
54
form of a lump sum or itemized amounts according to types of relief.
The complainant has thirty days from the date of receipt of the offer to
accept it.'55 No payment for attorney's fees and costs incurred after the
expiration of the thirty-day acceptance period shall be made if the
complainant does not accept the offer, and then subsequently fails to
obtain a more favorable award by the judge, the agency, or the EEOC on
appeal. 1 6 The acceptance must be in writing and postmarked or received
within the thirty-day period.'57 Other offers or settlement attempts may
still be made after an offer is rejected.'58

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

id. § 1614.108(g).
id.§ 1614.108(g).

Id.
Id. § 1614.109(a).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(a).
Id. § 1614.109(b).
Id. § 1614.109(c)(I).
Id. § 1614.109(c)(3).

Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(c)(3).

ld.
Id.
Id.
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The judge "shall notify the parties of the right to seek discovery
prior to the hearing and may issue such discovery orders as are
appropriate."' 59 The judge shall limit attendance at hearings to
individuals that he determines maintain direct knowledge about the
complaint.'6 Hearings are closed to the public because they are part of
62
the investigative process.16' Rules of evidence are not strictly applied.'
A party believing there is no genuine issue of material fact in the matter
may file a statement with the judge at least fifteen days before the
hearing and serve it on the opposing party.' 63 After considering opposing
statements, where discrimination is found to have taken place, the judge
may issue a decision without a hearing or make such other ruling as is
appropriate.'6 A decision may also be issued without a hearing on the
judge's own initiative if he determines that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, after hearing responses from the parties. 65 The judge shall
render a decision and order appropriate relief where discrimination is
found within 180 days of receiving the complaint file from the agency,
unless this time period is extended.' 66 The decision of the judge is the
final action of the agency unless the agency issues its own final order
67
within forty days of receipt of the judge's decision.'
If the agency issues its final order within forty days of receipt of the
judge's decision, the final order must notify the complainant as to
whether the agency will enforce the judge's decision.' 68 The complainant
must be informed of the right to appeal to the EEOC or file a civil
lawsuit. 69 The notice is required to inform the complainant of the
applicable time limits for appeals and lawsuits.' 70 If the agency's order
does not fully enforce the judge's decision, the agency shall
simultaneously appeal to the-EEOC and append a copy of the appeal to
its final order.' 7'

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. § 1614.109(d).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e).
Id.
Id. § 1614.109(e).
Id. § 1614.109(g).
Id. § 1614.109(2).
29 C.F.R. § 161 4 .109(g)(3).
Id. § 1614.109(h)(i).
Id. § 1614.109(h)(i).
Id. § 1614.110(a).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a).
Id.
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D. Class Complaints
The EEOC's revised federal sector complaint-processing
regulations allow class complaints to be filed. An employee wishing to
file a class complaint must still undergo counseling. 72 Where an
individual complaint is filed, the "complainant may move for class
certification at any reasonable point in the process when it becomes
apparent that there are class implications.
,," Within fifteen days of
receiving notice of the right to file a class complaint, the agent for the
class must file a class complaint with the agency that allegedly
discriminated.' 74 The regulations contain rules on hearings in class
complaints, final agency decisions, settlement offers, the right
75 to appeal
members.
class
individual
for
relief
and
action,
civil
or file a
E. Appeal
Complainants are permitted to appeal an agency's final action or
dismissal of a complaint. 76 As discussed earlier, the agency may also
appeal simultaneously where its final action does not fully implement
the decision of the judge. '17 Appeals by complainants or class agents
"must be filed within 30 days of receipt of the dismissal, final action or
decision."' 78 Appeals by the agency "must be filed within 40 days of
receipt of the hearing file and decision."'7 9 The appeal is filed with the
Office of Federal Operations at the EEOC.'80 It may be mailed, delivered
in person, or sent by facsimile, with a copy furnished to the opposing
party. 8
T

The Office of Federal Operations, on behalf of the EEOC, issues a
written decision with the reasons for its conclusion.'82 If discrimination is
found, "appropriate remedies shall be included in the decision."''8 3 Where
appropriate, entitlement to interest, attorney's fees or costs must be

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. § 1614.204(b).
Id.
Id. § 1614.204(c)(2).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.204.
Id. § 1614.401(a).
Id.§ 1614.110(a).
Id. § 1614.402(a).

Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a).

Id.
Id. § 1614.405(a).
Id. § 1614.405(a).
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indicated.'8 The decision is required to be transmitted to both the
complainant and the agency by first class mail, and to inform the
complainant of his or her civil action rights.'85 The decision is final
unless the8 6 EEOC grants a request for reconsideration within its
discretion.'
F. Time Periodfor FilingSuit
An individual complainant, class agent or claimant who has filed
for individual relief pursuant to a class complaint, may file suit in the
appropriate district court, provided that certain conditions are met.' 7
The suit must be filed within ninety days of receiving notice of the
EEOC's final decision on an appeal, or where no appeal is filed, within
ninety days of final action by the appropriate agency.' 8 Thus, in Ellison
v. Brady,89 an IRS employee filed civil suit after the EEOC determined
that the IRS had taken prompt and adequate remedial action following
her complaint of sexual harassment to the agency. '9° The time period for
filing suit is subject to equitable tolling.' 9'
G. Relief
Where a finding is made that a complainant has been subjected to
sexual harassment or another form of discrimination, the agency where
he or she works is required to provide full relief, including, but not
limited to, lost earnings, reinstatement and corrective action to prevent
recurrence of the discriminatory conduct.' 92 An applicant for
employment who was turned down for a position because the applicant
was discriminated against or because the applicant refused either to
submit to sexual advances or to requests for sexual favors, must be
offered the position, or an equivalent one in writing.'93 Such an offer is
not required if there is clear and convincing evidence that the applicant

184. Id.
185. 29C.F.R. §1614.405(a).
186. Id. § 1614.405(b).
187. Id. § 1614.407.
188. Id.;The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106 § 114, 105 Stat. 1079 (1991)
(extending the period for filing suit from thirty days to ninety days for federal employees).
189. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 873-75.
191. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 98 (1980).
192. 29C.F.R. § 1614.501.
193. Id. § 1614.501(b)(2).
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would not have been selected even absent the discrimination. 94 The offer
must be accepted or rejected within fifteen days of receipt.' 9 Back pay
shall be awarded from the date the applicant would have commenced
duty until the date he or she actually begins duty. 96 Where the offer is
declined, back pay with interest is still payable from the time the
applicant would have commenced duty to the date the offer is
declined.' 97 In its offer of employment, the agency is required to inform
the applicant of the right to an award of back pay in the event that the
offer is declined.' 98 Where adverse action affecting an agency employee
stemmed from his or her response to sexual harassment, the adverse
action may be rescinded and the employee made whole.' 99 Back pay may
be recovered) ° The agency, the judge, or the EEOC can grant an award
consisting of attorney's fees and expert witness fees or costs. O'Such an
2 Attorney's fees are not recoverable
award will be paid by the agency.02
for the pre-complaint process, unless an agency refuses to implement a
judge's decision, and that decision is affirmed by the EEOC on appeal.203
Where the agency requests reconsideration of an EEOC decision
ordering it to retroactively restore an employee who was removed,
separated from employment or suspended for a period continuing
beyond the date of the requested reconsideration, the agency is required
to temporarily reinstate the employee, pending the outcome of its
request. 21c If, however, the EEOC ordered the agency to pay monetary
relief, the payment may be delayed pending reconsideration of the
EEOC's decision, except that the agency must pay interest from the date
of the appellate decision if the monetary payment is affirmed.05
The agency's decision regarding temporary reinstatement or delay of
payment must be communicated in writing to the EEOC and the
employee simultaneously with the request for reconsideration, or the
EEOC will dismiss the request for reconsideration. 206 If the agency does
not request reconsideration, or a request for reconsideration is denied,
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. § 1614.501(b)-(c).
Id. § 1614.501(b)(1)(i).
Id. § 1614.501(b)(1)(ii).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(b)(1)(iii).
id. § 1614.501(b)(1)(iii).
Id. § 1614.501(a)(4).
Id. § 1614.501(c)(1).
Id. § 1614.501(e).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(ii).

203. Id. § 1614.501(e)(iv).
204. Id.§ 1614.502(b).
205. id. § 1614.502(b)(2).
206. Id. § 1614.502(b)(3).
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then the agency shall provide the full.relief ordered within sixty days
after receiving the final decision.207 The EEOC shall notify a complainant
of the right to file a civil action or seek judicial review when it
determines that an agency is not complying with a decision.
H. Interim Relief
When an agency appeals a judge's decision to retroactively restore
an employee who was removed or suspended for a period continuing
beyond the date of the appeal, the agency shall 'temporarily restore the
employee pending the outcome of. the appeal.2 9 "The employee may
decline the offer of interim relief.",2'0 The agency can also delay paying a
back pay award until an appeal is resolved.2 " However, the agency must
pay interest from the date of the original decision if the monetary award
is affirmed.2 2 If the agency -determines that returning the complainant to
the workplace will be unduly disruptive to the work environment, the
agency can, after notice to the complainant, decline restoration. 213
21 4
"However, prospective pay and benefits must be provided.
The agency's decision regarding temporary restoration or delay
payment must be communicated in writing to the EEOC and
employee at the same time as the appeal, or the EEOC will dismiss
appeal.2 5 A complainant may request dismissal
of an appeal if
21 6
agency refuses the required interim relief.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

of
the
the
the

29 C.F.R. § 1614.502(c).
Id. § 1614 .503(g).
Id. § 1614.505(a)(1).
Id.
Id. §1614.505(a)(3).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.505(a)(3).
Id. § 1614.505(a)(5).
Id.
Id. § 1614.505(a)(4).
Id. § 1614.505(b).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLAINT-PROCESSING AND
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. The Private-SectorFramework

1. The Public Policy Goal of Maximizing the Value of the
Private Sector as a Tool for Economic Growth
There are several policy objectives behind the complaint-processing
regulatory framework. One such policy objective is to maximize the
value of the private sector as a means of driving economic growth by
minimizing the risk of employment practices liability. Unlike the federal
sector complaint-processing regulations, the government does not
directly incorporate provisions in the private sector rules aimed at
eliminating or minimizing the cost of liability for sexual harassment and
other unlawful employment practices to private sector employers.
Instead, the government attempts to achieve its policy objective through
the remedial scheme of providing victims of employment discrimination
with equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and
attorney's and expert's fees under Title VII.2 7 This scheme induces
private employers to adopt and implement risk management programs
which minimize their risk of employment' practices liability and
maximize the value of their firms to drive economic growth.
The government strengthened the inducement of private employers
to adopt prophylactic measures to prevent and remedy harassment and
discrimination by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.218 Section 1981a
of the Act29 allows a complaining party to recover compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional disc220
A plaintiff may also
recover expert's fees as part of an award of attorney's fees. 2 ' In sexual
harassment cases, the damages are capped according to the number of
employees the employer had "in each day of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the preceding or current calendar year," as follows:

217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)-(b), 2000e-5(g), (k) (2000).
218. Id. § 1981a(a)(1).

219. Id. § 1981a.
220. Id. § 198 1a(a)-(b).
221.

Id.§ 1981a.
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(A) $50,000 for employers with 15-100 employees;
(B) $100,000 for employers with 101-200 employees;

(C) $200,000 for employers with 201-500 employees;
(D) $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. 222
A party seeking money damages can demand a jury trial.22 3 The jury
is not to be informed of the statutory caps.'2 In Pollard v. E.L Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 221 the Supreme Court recently held that front pay
awards are not an element of compensatory damages and, therefore, not
subject to the statutory caps on damages. 6 The prospect of employment
practices liability arising from a judgment or settlement, including court
costs and attorney's fees, represents a significant exposure. The median
compensatory award in discrimination and sexual harassment cases was
reported to be $250,000 in 1997.227 The median award for punitive
damages in sexual harassment cases was reported to be $100,000 for the
same period.228
The Supreme Court has also recently reinforced the objective of
Title VII by inducing private employersa •• to• implement
prophylactic
221
.•
measures to prevent and remedy discrimination.
In Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, 3° the Court held that an employer might be
found liable for punitive damages if a managerial agent acted within the
scope of employment and with knowledge that its actions may violate
federal law.21 However, the employer may avoid liability if it has made
good faith32efforts to comply with the antidiscrimination provisions of
Title VII.
The Supreme Court has also redefined the contours of employer
liability for harassment by a supervisor. In Faragherv. City of Boca
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
223. Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
224. Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
225. 532 U.S. 843 (2001).
226. Id. at 852-54.
227. Michael Bradford, Size of Jury Awards Up, Fueled by EPL Claims, Bus. INS., Mar. 8,
1991, at 4 [hereinafter Jury Awards].
228. Id.
229. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
230. Id. at 526.
231. Id. at 536.
232. Id. at 545-46; Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that evidence that managers repeatedly ignored sexual harassment complaints negated the defense
that the employer made good faith efforts to comply with Title Vil; punitive damages were,
therefore, justified); EEOC v. WaI-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 1999)
(applying the Kolstad standard to find the employer liable because although the employer had a
written and disseminated antidiscrimination policy, some of its own managers were unaware of it,
and had not received training on how to enforce it).
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Raton233 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,3 both decided the
same day, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable for
harassment by a supervisor, even when it did not result in an adverse
employment action, unless it can establish an affirmative defense.235
"The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised, reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise., 23 6 No affirmative
defense is available where the harassment results in an adverse
employment action or tangible job detriment."'
The government has also issued guidelines238 for private sector
employers to help them minimize their risk of employment practices
liability.23 9 In the Guidelines, the EEOC states that "prevention is the
best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment., 240 The EEOC advises
employers to have an explicit policy on harassment. that is clearly
communicated to employees and effectively implemented.24
2. The Public Policy Goal of Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO")
in Private Employment
Another policy goal behind the private statutory and complaintprocessing framework is equal employment opportunity. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in an attempt to combat
discrimination in the American workplace.2 42 The government's
overriding policy objective behind the statute was its concern for equal

233. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
234. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Liability for harassment by coworkers and third parties is still
governed by negligence principles. In such cases, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment, yet failed to take prompt remedial action. Id. at 758-59;
Faragher,524 U.S. at 789.
235. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
236. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
237. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
238. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2002); Because of Sex Guidelines, supra note 4, at 74676.
239. Because of Sex Guidelines, supra note 4, at 74676; Compliance Manual, supra note 6, §
615.3.
240. 29C.F.R. § 1603.11(f).
241. Id.; EEOC: Policy. Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 FEP MANUAL (BNA), 405:6681,
405:6693 (Mar. 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment];
Compliance Manual, supra note 6, § 615.3.
242. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat. 253) 2391, 2401.
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employment opportunity. 24 The statute's legislative history reveals that
it was designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of
discrimination on a nationwide basis.2" In the House Report
accompanying the bill, Representative George Meader stated that it was
the official policy of the U.S. Government to treat all citizens alike and
that the purpose of the bill was to effectuate this longstanding national
policy.2 45 He further stated that Congress can and should take action
within its constitutional powers to carry out our national policy against
discrimination and use tried and established sanctions to enforce public
policy in such legislation. 24' As previously seen, the EEOC provides
guidance to private employers on addressing harassment and providing a
discrimination-free workplace.
The complaint-processing regulations do not directly incorporate
measures specifically designed to promote the government's policy
objective of equal employment opportunity. Instead, the government
uses the remedial scheme of the antidiscrimination statutes to promote
this policy objective by providing equitable relief, compensatory and
punitive damages, attorney's and expert's fees to private plaintiffs who
prevail in Title VII cases. This statutory scheme, buttressed by judicial
definitions of the parameters governing the award of compensatory and
punitive damages, induces private employers to adopt antidiscrimination
policies that promote a discrimination-free workplace.
3. The Public Policy Goal of Providing Private Sector Discrimination
Victims With Full, Fair and Prompt Relief in a Non-Adversarial Manner
Alternative dispute resolution has played an increasingly vital role
in the American judicial system in the past decades. The advantages of
securing expeditious and less costly ways of resolving disputes are
clearly recognized. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA") 7
gives clear support to the principle of alternative dispute resolution
within well-defined limits. 248 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,249 the
Supreme Court held that the FAA applies to all employment contracts
243. Alexander,.415 U.S. at 44; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat. 253) 2391, 2391.
244. Title'VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78
Stat. 253) 2391, 2391.
245. Id. at 2412.
246. ld.at 2415.
247. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-200 (2000).
248. Id. § 1.
249. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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except those of workers in the transportation industry. 20 The Court

stressed that requiring the FAA to exclude all employment contracts
purposes and breed
would undermine the statute's pro-arbitration
25
it. '
litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,252 the government

specifically incorporated a provision encouraging the use of alternative
dispute resolution where appropriate, and to the extent authorized by
law. 253 Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are quicker, cheaper
and less adversarial than litigation, thus allowing for a more expeditious
resolution of discrimination complaints.5 Another policy objective
clearly emerges from the above statutory framework, namely, providing
discrimination victims with prompt relief in a non-adversarial manner.
The government does not directly incorporate provisions in the
private sector complaint-processing regulations aimed at promoting this
objective.255 Instead, it uses the statutory framework of the FAA and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to induce private sector employers to utilize
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to promote this policy
objective.
B. The FederalSector Framework

1. The Public Policy Goal of Minimizing the Government's
Employment Practices Liability
Unlike the indirect inducements it uses in the private sector
framework to promote its policy objectives in the employment arena, the
government specifically incorporates direct measures in the federal
sector framework to promote those objectives.256 The mandatory
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and provisions for agencies to
250. Id. at 109.
251. Id. at 123. Section 1 of the Act excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in commerce." Id. at 109 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1).
All circuits except the Ninth Circuit held the exception to apply only to transportation industry
employment contracts, not all employment contracts. The Supreme Court applied the ejusdem
generis rule to hold that the term "any other class of workers engaged in commerce" should be
controlled and defined by reference to "seamen" and "railroad employees." Id. at 114.
252. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
253. Id.
254. CircuitCity Stores, 532 U.S. at 123.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994).
256. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(2) (2002).
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offer permanent and temporary relief in the federal sector framework are
designed to reduce the government's risk of potential liability from
litigation for employment discrimination in order to maximize the value
of the federal treasury.257 This, in turn, would allow the government to
pursue its economic agenda more successfully.
The government also seeks to prevent liability for employment
discrimination by requiring the education of new and existing hires on
discrimination issues. 258 Agencies must communicate their policies to all
job candidates and employees and provide training to managers and
259
supervisors on their equal opportunity programs.
The federal sector regulations do not allow complainants to recover
punitive damages in employment discrimination cases, thus limiting the
government's potential liability.2' 6 The regulations only provide for
payment on a make-whole basis.26'
Each federal agency is required to establish a system for
periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the agency's overall equal
262
Agencies must also, at regular
employment opportunity effort.
intervals, appraise their personnel operations to assure conformity with
programs, regulations and management directives of the EEOC.263
In order to motivate complainants to settle their complaints to
reduce costs to the government, the regulations allow agencies to make
offers of resolution to aggrieved persons after the filing of a written
complaint.26 Offers of resolution are required to be in writing, and must
265
include attorney's fees and costs, along with any non-monetary relief.
With respect to monetary relief, an agency may make a lump sum offer
covering all forms of monetary liability, or itemize the amount and types
of monetary relief offered. 266 The employee has thirty days from receipt
of the offer to accept.267 The regulations provide that if a settlement offer
is rejected, and relief that is subsequently granted by an administrative
judge, agency, or the EEOC on appeal, is not more favorable than the

257. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(2). The median compensatory award for discrimination and
sexual harassment in 1997 was $250,000. See Jury Awards, supra note 227, at 4.
258. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a)(4)-(5).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 1614.501 (failing to mention punitive damages).
261. Id. § 1614.501(a)(4).
262. Id. § 1614.102(a)(10).
263. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(3).
264. Id. § 1614.109(c)(1).
265. Id. § 1614.109(c)(3).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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offer, the complainant shall not receive attorney's fees or costs incurred
after the expiration of the acceptance period.268 Offers for full relief may
include offering applicants a position they were denied, or reinstating
employees with back pay and interest because of harassment or
discrimination (where sovereign immunity has been waived).269
2. The Public Policy Goal of Equal Employment Opportunity in
Federal Employment
Having determined employment discrimination practices to be
serious social and public ills, Congress attempted to combat the practices
through a number of important statutes. The most comprehensive of
these antidiscrimination statutes is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.27 0 Congress also recognized that discrimination in federal sector
employment was a serious problem, and extended the protections of
Title VII to the federal sector through the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972.27 The purpose of the statute was to strengthen
the EEOC's enforcement powers and extend protection to federal, state
and local government employees.272
The statute's legislative history states that it was an effort to
implement in a meaningful way the national policy of equal employment
opportunity. 273 The House Conference Report stated that the persistence
of discrimination required a reaffirmation of the national policy of equal
opportunity in employment.274 The House Report also noted that equal
employment opportunity in federal employment is based on the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and Congress' own statement of policy. 75 Congress stated "[i]t is the
policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for
federal employees without discrimination because of race, color,

268. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(c)(3).
269. Id. § 1614.501(b)(ii), (c)(i).
270. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994 & Supp. 2001). This statute did not protect federal
employees. Id. § 2000e(b), (0.
271. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137.
272. Id. The statute gave the EEOC the power, after it had exhausted the procedures for
achieving voluntary compliance, to issue complaints, hold hearings, issue cease and desist orders
and seek enforcement of its orders in federal courts. Id.
273. Id. at 2138.
274. Id. at 2139.
275. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2157.
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79

religion, sex, or national origin. 276 It further noted that a critical defect
of the federal government's equal employment opportunity program was
the failure of the complaint process, and the general lack of confidence
in the effectiveness of the procedure on the part of federal employees.277
To promote its policy objective of ensuring equal opportunity in
federal employment, the government has incorporated measures for
investigating and conciliating discrimination claims and compensating
discrimination victims. 2 Also, agencies must designate a Director of
Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO Director") and EEO Officers.279
The names and numbers of the director and officers must be publicized
to all employees at all times. ° Written materials are to be made
available to all employees and applicants informing them of equal
employment opportunity programs and remedial procedures available to
them.2 1' The written materials are to be posted in all personnel and EEO
offices throughout the workplace.282
Occasionally, each EEO Director is required to evaluate "the
sufficiency of the total agency program for equal employment
opportunity and report[] to the head of the agency .... , 283 The report is to
be submitted with recommendations for improvement and correction,
including disciplinary action with respect to managerial, supervisory, or
other employees who have failed in their responsibilities.
When
authorized by the agency head, the EEO Director can make changes in
programs and procedures designed to eliminate harassment and other
discriminatory practices."'
Agencies must establish a system to collect and maintain accurate
employment information for use in studies and analyses that contribute
28 6
to achieving the government's goal of equal employment opportunity
They must report to the EEOC information on pre-complaint counseling
and the status, processing and disposition of complaints under the
regulations; then they must describe the allocation of personnel and

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §7151 (Supp. H 1965, 1966)).
Id. at 2158-59.
Id. at 2145-47.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(4) (2002).
Id § 1614.102(b)(7).
Id. § 1614.102(b)(5).
Id. § 1614.102(b)(5), (b)(7).
Id. § 1614.102(c)(2).
29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(c)(2).
Id. § 1614.102(c)(3).
Id. §§ 1614.102(a), 1614.601(a), (e).
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resources proposed by the agency to carry out its equal employment
opportunity program.287
The government specifically states in the federal sector complaintprocessing regulations that its policy is "to provide equal opportunity in
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in
employment.., and to promote full realization of equal employment
288
opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each agency.,
Each agency must "maintain a continuing affirmative program to
promote equal opportunity and to identify and eliminate discriminatory
practices and policies., 289 Agencies must also conduct a continuing
campaign to rid discrimination from their work policies, procedures and
environment.290
In furtherance of the government's policy objective, remedial
action is required when discrimination is found. 9 In the case of a class
complaint, the agency must eliminate or modify the employment policy
or practice out of which the complaint arose. 292 In the case of :an
individual complaint, full relief shall be provided, which includes a
commitment to take "corrective, curative or preventive action" to
prevent recurrence, and a commitment by the agency to cease from
engaging in the specific unlawful employment practice found to exist.294
3. The Public Policy Goal of Providing Discrimination Victims in
Federal Sector Employment with Full, Fair and Prompt Relief in a
Non-Adversarial Manner
Before the federal complaint-processing regulations were revised
by section 1614, there was a continuing perception of unfairness in the
federal complaint process.29 ' Because agencies, under the old rules, could
revise decisions of administrative judges regarding whether the agency
had violated the law, there were widespread perceptions that the process

287. Id. § 1614.104(b).
288. Id. § 1614.101(a).
289. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a).
290. Id. § 1614.102(a)(3).
291. Id. § 1614.501(a).
292. Id. § 1614.204(k)(1).
293. Id. § 1614.501(a)(5).
294. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a)(2), (a)(5).
295. Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 12634, 12637
(Apr. 10, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1614) [hereinafter Federal Sector Equal Employment
Opportunity].
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was not impartial. 96 The revised regulations, therefore, aimed at
promoting the governmental objective of providing discrimination
victims with full, fair and prompt relief in a non-adversarial manner."'
The mandatory alternative dispute resolution procedures and provisions
for permanent and interim relief are designed to achieve this policy
objective." 8
The federal regulations require the EEOC to "periodically review
agency resources and procedures to ensure that an agency makes
reasonable efforts to resolve complaints informally, to process
complaints in a timely manner, to develop adequate factual records,
[and] to issue decisions consistent with acceptable legal standards....
Federal agencies must also provide for the prompt, fair and impartial
processing of complaints. 3°° They must establish and make available an
alternative dispute resolution program for both the pre-complaint and the
complaint process. 3° ' Each EEO Director is responsible for "[a]ssuring
that individual complaints are fairly and thoroughly investigated and that
final action is taken in a. timely manner in accordance" with the
regulations.3 2 The counseling and alternative dispute resolution process
may allow a result by informal resolution. 303
To promote the government's objective of providing discrimination
victims with full, fair and prompt relief in a non-adversarial manner, the
regulations allow agencies to make offers of resolution to aggrieved
persons after the filing of a written complaint.30 Offers of resolution are
required to be in writing, and must include attorney's fees and costs,
along with any non-monetary relief.05 With respect to monetary relief,
an agency may make a lump sum offer covering all forms of monetary
liability, or itemize the amount and types of monetary relief offered. 3 6
The employee has thirty days from receipt of the offer to accept.3 7
The regulations provide that if a settlement offer is rejected, and relief
296. Id. at 12636-37; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(iv).
297. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a)(2), (b)(2).
298. See Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity supra note 295, at 12634. In
announcing the adoption of the final rules for section 1614, the EEOC commented on how the new
rules sought to address the perceived unfairness of the federal complaint process. See id. at 12636.
299. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.104(b).
300. Id. § 1614.102(a)(2).
301. Id. § 1614.102(b)(2).
302. Id. § 1614.102(c)(5).
303. Id. §§ 1614.102, 1614.105.
304. 29C.F.R. § 1614.109(c)(1).
305. Id. § 1614.109(c)(3).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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that is subsequently granted by an administrative judge, agency, or the
EEOC on appeal is not more favorable than the offer, the complainant
cannot receive attorney's fees or costs incurred after the expiration of the
requisite acceptance period.0 8 Offers of full relief may include offering
applicants a position they were denied because of harassment or
discrimination, or reinstating employees who lost their jobs as a result of
harassment or discrimination, with back pay and interest (where
sovereign immunity has been waived). °9
V. RATIONALITY OF THE PRIVATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS AND THE ADEQUACY TO PROMOTE THE

GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC POLICY GOALS

A. The PrivateSector Framework
As discussed above, the private sector complaint-processing rules
do not directly incorporate measures designed to promote the
government's policy goals. Instead, the government uses the framework
of antidiscrimination statutes and their judicial interpretation to induce
private sector employers to implement prophylactic measures to prevent
and remedy discrimination, thereby promoting the policy goal of
maximizing the value of private firms as a tool for economic growth.1
Measures aimed at preventing and remedying harassment also promote
the policy goal of equal employment opportunity.
With respect to the government's public and social policy goal of
ensuring that employment discrimination victims are compensated fully;
fairly and promptly in a non-adversarial manner, the government has
provided the legal framework to induce the voluntary use of arbitration
in the private sector regulations."' The attraction of a qu'icker, cheaper
308. Id.
309. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a)-(c).
310. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court held that an employer is
vicariously liable for harassment by a supervisor not involving an adverse employment action,
unless it can establish an affirmative defense showing. 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). In Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, the Supreme Court held that an employer might be found liable for punitive
damages if a managerial agent acted within the scope of employment and with knowledge that its
actions may violate federal law. 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1998). An employer may avoid liability,
however, if it has made good faith efforts to comply with the antidiscrimination provisions of Title
VII. Id. Liability for harassment by coworkers and third parties is still governed by negligence
principles. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Brooks v. City of San
Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2000).
311. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
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and less adversarial process for resolving employment discrimination
complaints has led many employers to require mandatory arbitration of
employment disputes as a condition of employment.3' 2 The Supreme
Court's ruling in Circuit City Stores will likely fuel this trend.313
The private sector framework, therefore, is adequate to promote the
government's policy goals.
The private sector framework is rational from a policy viewpoint.
It allows the government to promote its policy goals in private
employment without legislating the measures private employers must
take. Incorporating specific measures in the private sector framework to
promote the government's policy goals would amount to the government
assuming the role of risk manager of employment practices for the
private sector. This result would be neither practical nor desirable.
The approach would also raise legitimate questions of excessive
regulation and complicate issues of liability.

105, 122-23 (2001) (discussing the FAA's policy favoring arbitration and narrowly construing the
FAA section exempting certain employment contracts from its scope).
312. CircuitCity Stores, 532 U.S. at 123.
313. Employers must, of course, be cognizant of the legal constraints governing arbitration
agreements. For example, federal circuits are split on the validity of arbitration agreements that
require the parties to split the arbitrator's fees. See, e.g., Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc.,
253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitration agreement in an employment
contract requiring the parties to share equally arbitration fees and costs is illegal and unenforceable
because it limits the rights of prevailing parties to obtain fees and costs normally allowed under
Title VII); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233, 1235-36 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that a mandatory arbitration agreement entered into as a condition of continued
employment, which requires an employee to pay a portion of the arbitrator's fees, is unenforceable
under the FAA); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that
the plaintiff could not be required to agree to arbitrate his public law claims as a condition of
employment if the agreement requires him to pay all or part of the arbitrator's fees and expenses);
cf. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1358, 1362-63
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitration agreement mandating the splitting of fees and costs is not
per se unenforceable, but subject to a case-by-case analysis to see if the employee is able to pay fees
and costs, and whether doing so would deter the employee from bringing a claim); Koveleskie v.
SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) (ruling that judicial review of arbitration
awards is sufficient to protect statutory rights); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding both arbitration agreements on grounds that
the plaintiffs are not usually asked to bear forum fees in the securities industry and judicial review
would be available if unreasonable fees were imposed). Furthermore, commentators believe the
decision in Circuit City Stores will boost the popularity of an already popular way of settling
disputes. Arbitration Isn't Only Tool, Bus. INS., Apr. 2, 2001, at 8.
314. For example, what principles would govern the liability of an employer who implemented
specific measures relating to employment practices dictated in legislation?
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B. The FederalSector Framework
The federal regulations contain detailed measures specifically
designed to achieve the government's policy goals in the federal
employment arena. As already discussed, the government has adopted
detailed measures governing conciliation, investigation, hearings of
complaints, and the offer of permanent and temporary relief by
agencies." 5 The regulations also provide for the education of new and
existing hires on discrimination issues and the training of managers and
supervisors."' The regulations limit the government's liability by
excluding the recovery of punitive damages. 1 7 The government also
seeks to limit its total costs for employment practices liability by
inducing complainants to accept settlement offers that are fair.3 ' Thus, if
a settlement offer is rejected but the complainant subsequently fails to
get more favorable relief, the complainant cannot recover attorney's fees
or costs incurred after the settlement offer expired.3 ' In the aggregate,
these measures are adequate to promote the government's policy goal of
minimizing its potential liability for employment practices and
maximizing the value of the federal treasury.
Several measures combine to promote the policy objective of equal
employment opportunity in the federal workplace. The regulations
incorporate provisions for investigating discrimination complaints and
compensating victims of discrimination.320 All agencies must designate
EEO Directors and officers and inform employees in writing of equal
employment opportunity programs and remedies.' Equal opportunity
programs must be evaluated and recommendations for improvement and
correction must be made to the agency head. 2 Agencies must collect
and maintain accurate data for use in studies that promote equal
employment opportunity.2 Agencies must also identify and eliminate
discriminatory practices and policies and conduct a campaign to
eradicate discrimination from their work environment.2 The breadth and
specificity of these collective measures ensure their adequacy to promote
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000).
Id. § 2000e-16(b).
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.20, 1614.109(c) (2002).
Id. § 1614.109(c)(3).
Id. § 1614.
Id. § 1614.102(b).
Id. § 1614.102(c)(2).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a)(1), (c)(2).
Id. § 1614.102(c)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(e) (2000).
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the government's policy goal of equal employment opportunity in the
federal workplace.
Finally, the federal regulations again employ a multiplicity of
specific measures to promote the government's policy objective of
providing federal discrimination victims with full, fair and prompt relief
in a non-adversarial manner. The federal sector rules are designed to
minimize lawsuits and facilitate informal resolution of federal
employment discrimination complaints by requiring alternative dispute
resolution programs at both the pre-complaint and complaint stages.325
The EEOC is required to periodically review agency procedures to
ensure that they are making reasonable efforts to resolve complaints
informally and in a timely manner.3 26 The processing of complaints is
required to be prompt, fair and impartial.3 27 EEO Directors are required
to ensure that complaints are fairly and thoroughly investigated and that
final action is taken in a timely manner.3 28 The regulations allow
agencies to make offers of resolution to employees who file written
complaints. 29 These measures, in the aggregate, are adequate to promote
the government's policy objective of providing discrimination victims
with full, fair and prompt relief in a manner that is as non adversarial as
possible.
The government's incorporation of specific measures in the federal
regulatory framework to promote its policy objectives is rational from a
policy viewpoint. The government does not leave individual federal
agencies to adopt and implement measures to promote its policy
objectives, an approach that would in all likelihood result in
inconsistency, lack of coordination and, possibly, inadequate measures
at the individual agency level. Instead, the government legislates the
measures all agencies must take and, thus, properly assumes the role of
risk manager of its employment practices in a coordinated and integrated
manner that promotes its policy objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Extensive rules govern the processing of harassment and
discrimination complaints in both the private and federal employment
sectors. Unlike the private sector framework, the federal sector rules
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(2).
Id. § 1614.102(a)(10), (c)(5).
Id. § 1614.102(a)(2).
Id. § 1614.102(c)(5).
Id. § 1614.109(c).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

35

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2
86

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 20:51

incorporate layers of pre-complaint and complaint procedures with builtin mechanisms to directly promote the government's policy goals.
Although using different approaches, both the federal and private
regulatory schemes are rational from a policy viewpoint, and contain
adequate measures to promote the government's employment related
policy objectives.
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